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Aquinas on Mind, by Anthony Kenny. New York: Routledge, 1995, Pp.
182. $13.95 (paper).
GYULA KLIMA, University of Notre Dame
Anthony Kenny's book is one of the best of its genre, exemplifying the
kind of introduction into (some field of) Aquinas's thought that endeavors to make his ideas accessible to the philosophically interested contemporary reader in terms of such philosophical, scientific and everyday
concepts with which the reader can safely be assumed to be familiar.
Indeed, Kenny's book provides us with such a good example of this
genre that it brings into sharp focus the problems of the genre itself.
Therefore, while duly acknowledging the book's virtues of clarity of presentation, and its highly readable, almost conversational style, let me
concentrate in this brief review on this problematic aspect of Kenny's
book, as someone who is just as much concerned with making Aquinas
accessible to a contemporary audience as the author is.
In fact, my task is made relatively easy by Kenny himself, since at the
beginning of the book he clearly points out the main source of the primary difficulty of his enterprise (16-18), although it is then all the more
surprising how little attention he pays to this difficulty in the actual
treatment of his subject.
In line with Kenny's observations in this passage, Aquinas's thoughts
on the human mind can by no means be characterized as providing us
with just another interesting (not to say, exotic) theory in the field commonly designated as "the philosophy of mind" in contemporary philosophy. For whereas the main problem of the contemporary field can justifiably be described as the problem of providing a coherent, philosophically acceptable account of the relationship between "the mental" and
lithe physical", for Aquinas this would be a pseudo-problem, constituted
by a false dichotomy. The reason why Aquinas could react in this way is
precisely what Kenny so clearly points out, namely, that the way in
which Aquinas would delineate the realm of mental phenomena is radically different from the way modern philosophers would do the same.
To put it briefly, for modern philosophers the realm of mind is the realm
of consciousness, defined by the ("privileged") access self-conscious subjects have to their states of consciousness. By contrast, what constitutes
the realm of mind for Aquinas is the domain of the peculiar vital operations of a rational animal, and accordingly, the faculties or powers
accounting for these operations, intellect and will. This of course also
establishes a certain dichotomy between mental and non-mental, but not
the sort of dichotomy between mental and physical that has been operative in the post-Cartesian tradition-for instance, pain is not a mental
phenomenon for Aquinas, but speech is.
Yet given this radical difference between the more familiar modern
conception and Aquinas's conception of the very subject matter of this
inquiry, anyone presenting their relevant thoughts should always be on
the alert as to what we can or should take for granted in Aquinas's conception, and what we usually do, but perhaps should not, take for grant-
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ed in the modern conception in these considerations. Indeed, this sort of
alertness is required not only concerning issues directly involving
Aquinas's obviously different conception of mind, but even in the case
of such apparently absolutely "risk-free" considerations as the interpretation of the term 'body' (corpus). However, for Aquinas the term 'body'
functions both as the correlative of 'soul' (in the context of the claim that
a human being consists of body and soul, whence in this sense of 'body'
a human being has a body, but is not a body) and as the generic term signifying the substantial form of both living and non-living bodies, which
in the case of living things is their soul (and in this sense of 'body' a
human being is a body). So, failure to take note of these different senses
of the same term leads Kenny to raise some totally misguided objections
to Aquinas's conception, contrasting his view with a "strict
Aristotelian", "hylomorphic" view. (25-28, 138-139, 150-151) Had Kenny
taken into account Aquinas's explicit distinction between the two senses
of 'body' in these different contexts, he could have easily avoided this
pitfall.' But instead, he apparently relied on what might seem to be an
intuitively clear notion, simply ignoring the implication of his own correct observations that what may seem intuitively clear to us was not necessarily intuitively clear in the same way for Aquinas, precisely because
of his radically different conceptualization of the issues under discussion. Yet we may add that it is precisely this radically different conceptualization that might render the study of Aquinas particularly enlightening for the modern reader, presenting us with a refreshingly different
perspective on our own inquiries, teaching us not to take for granted
certain things that we otherwise usually do.
Mutatis mutandis, the same can be said about Kenny's fumbled treatment of the notion of phantasm (sensory information received, stored,
retrieved and/ or further processed by the sensitive faculties of an animal), comparing it to what he apparently takes to be an intuitively clear
notion of mental image, and then wondering why Aquinas at times
seems to speak as if we had mental images in sense perception (38),
why he seems to attribute mental images to animals (39), and in general
whether he held "the regrettable theory that external sense-experience
was accompanied by a parallel series of phenomena in the imagination" (93). Well, I for one certainly do not find this notion of "mental
image" intuitively clear at all, even if I am of course familiar with the
modern philosophical tradition that takes it for granted. Am I supposed to have a "mental image" in my mind when I am listening to
Beethoven's Pastoral, when I am recalling it, and when I am inventing
possible variations of it; or am I just receiving, retrieving, and further
processing auditory information? But then this may be just my problem. In any case, while on p. 37 we are informed that "Clearly a phantasm is like a mental image. But the two do not seem to be entirely
equivalent.", on p. 38 we can only learn that " ... he [Aquinasl did not
mean by 'phantasm' simply a mental image". What we do not learn
about at all is what we should understand by a "mental image", and in
what way our assumed familiarity with mental images could be helpful
in understanding Aquinas, given that Aquinas's theory apparently
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does not have much to do with them, whatever they are.
Again, considering Aquinas's conception of the immateriality of the
intellectual soul, Kenny wonders how Aquinas could ever maintain
that a form could exist without matter, save for his non-philosophical,
religious beliefs, and "a disconcerting disdain for distinctions between
abstract and concrete" (138). But it is rather Kenny's discussion that is
marred by an utterly disconcerting disdain for Aquinas's own distinction
between the different modes of signifying of abstract and concrete
terms, and his analyses of under what conditions there are real distinctions between distinct entities, indeed, distinct types of entities, corresponding to this semantic distinction, and under what conditions there
are no such real distinctions, while the semantic distinction still remains
in force. 2 Instead, Kenny uses the garden-variety, but hopefully "intuitively clear" talk about "abstract and concrete" [terms, or entities other
than terms?-Kenny never tells], so no wonder he ends up with blaming Aquinas for confusion.'
Many similar examples could be listed from Kenny's book,' but I
think even the ones mentioned here should enable us to draw some
quite general lessons concerning the whole enterprise of making
Aquinas's thought accessible to the contemporary philosophical audience as well as concerning the place of Kenny's book in this enterprise.
First, as should be obvious, we shall never understand properly any of
Aquinas's theories without first "learning his language". However,
"learning his language" does not mean just learning Latin, but rather
acquiring the radically different conceptual apparatus encoded in his
language, constantly reflecting on how this different apparatus constitutes its own self-evident truths, while questioning the validity of what
we take to be self-evident truths on account of the conceptual apparatus
encoded in our philosophical language. Second, we shall never be able to
communicate our understanding of Aquinas authentically unless we
learn how to "teach his language". For if we do not manage to "teach his
language", the best we can come up with is some more or less matching
"translation" of his thought, with the appropriate footnotes on the
defects of available "translations", and recurrent complaints on the
"confusions" of the author, as is exemplified by Kenny's book. But in
order to be able to "teach this language", we have to provide the appropriate "learning tools", that is, to put the whole point in less metaphorical terms, we have to provide the contemporary reader with a description of the underlying semantics of St. Thomas's substantive philosophical theories, constituting the self-evident principles presupposed by those
theories. The best passages of Kenny's book from this point of view are
precisely the ones in which he remarks on certain principles of Aquinas
that they should be taken as "truisms"-it is a pity that these remarks do
not stand together to form a consistent methodology.
In fact, it might seem preposterous that I should call attention to the
importance of semantic analysis in connection with the approach of an
outstanding analytic philosopher. However, as a rule, contemporary
philosophers have the unfortunate propensity to take as the ultimate
standard of the correctness of their (or others') analyses something
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which is "intuitively clear", without any further qualification. But it is precisely the study of Aquinas that should make us realize today more than
ever that what may appear intuitively clear, or self-evident to us (per se
notum quoad nos) may not be self-evident to others, let alone in itself (per se
notum secundum se)-whereas what is self-evident in itself, or at least
what used to be self-evident to our predecessors, is definitely no longer
self-evident to us. 5
In view of the above-mentioned troubles with Kenny's approach
(and many others not mentioned here, but the reader may also wish to
consult Robert Pasnau's review of the same book in The Philosophical
Review, 4(1994), pp. 745-748), I find this book rather disappointing, not
only from the point of view of the Aquinas scholar, but especially from
the point of view of those students of Aquinas who think Aquinas's
thought bears more than historical relevance to our philosophical concerns. At the beginning of the book Kenny promises to show us
"through a close reading of texts from Aquinas that medieval thinkers
still have much to teach us about the philosophy of mind" (20). I sincerely believe that medieval thinkers in general and Aquinas in particular do
have a great deal to teach us about the philosophy of mind, so I find it
particularly regrettable that Kenny never fulfills this promise. In fact, in
Kenny's book, instead of getting the well-deserved role of our teacher,
Aquinas gets chided at every turn when he does not quite meet Kenny's
identifiably Wittgenstein-Ryle-informed expectations. Nevertheless, on
account of the virtues of the book mentioned at the beginning of this
review, I also think that despite all these shortcomings, with the careful
guidance of a competent Aquinas scholar, Kenny's book can playa useful role in an introductory course on Aquinas's philosophy of mind.
NOTES
1.
Cf. for example, EE, c. 3; SeG lb. 4, cpo 81, n. 7; 1SN ds. 25, q. 1, a. 1,
ad 2-um. Klima, G. (1997) "Man = Body + Soul: Aquinas's Arithmetic of
Human Nature," in Philosophical Stlldies in Religion, Metaphysics, and Ethics.
Essays in Honour of Heikki Kirjavainen, eds. Timo Koistinen and Tommi
Lehtonen (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola Society, 1997), pp. 179-197.
2.
For a detailed discussion of these issues see Klima, G.: "The
Semantic Principles Underlying Saint Thomas Aquinas's Metaphysics of
Being", Medieval Philosophy and Theology, (5)1996, pp. 87-141, especially n. 96.
3.
In fact, Kenny's discussion ofthis issue throughout the book seems
to suffer from what may be called "the curse of J. S. Mill's ghost", namely,
the implicit, but in contemporary analytic philosophy still prevalent (since
presumably "intuitively clear") assumption that while concrete terms name
concrete entities (i.e., particulars with genuine causal powers), abstract
terms name only the attributes or properties of the former, which are presumablv "abstract entities" [universals?, entia rationis?-we never learn]' in
any case, some quasi-entities without any agency or other sort of causality.
(For Kenny's troubles see pp. 133, 138, 149. For Mill's analysis see "Of
Names and Propositions", in: J. L. Garfield and M. Kiteley: Meaning and
Truth, Paragon House: New York, 1991, pp. 8-34, especially, p. 17; also, note
the easy shift from 'form' to 'attribute' in n. 8, on p. 33.) However, for
Aquinas an abstract common term is the common name of the (ultimate)
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significata of its concrete counterpart, which signifies the forms of those
things which fall under it. But forms for Aquinas, even if they of course can
be conceived and thus signified in an abstract, universal manner, are nothing
but the individualized determination of some particular act of real being,
and this is precisely why they are the principle of being and action in any
sort of agency.
4.
Just to take one more example, from the chapter on appetite and
will, consider Kenny's self-assured judgment that Aquinas's natural teleology "is something which must be discarded if we are to make any use of his
philosophy at the present time", on the hopefully "intuitively clear" basis
that while the growth of a plant is teleological, the falling of a stone is not.
(p. 61.) To be sure, Kenny deserves credit here for not assuming the otherwise perhaps also "intuitively clear", but in Aquinas's Aristotelian framework totally false and unjustified claim that all teleological activities must be
conscious. On the other hand, he never even tries to consider how Aquinas
may have held that even the falling of a stone is teleological. To that end,
however, Kenny would have had to give a comprehensive account of
Aquinas's theory of causation in the overall context of his Aristotelian natural philosophy, which is again radically different from modern conceptions
of causation. But since Kenny fails to do so, his account is misleading also in
the subsequent chapter, where he simply classifies Aquinas as a "soft determinist", as if the contemporary classification could be applied to Aquinas's
theories without any further ado, despite the radical differences between
Aquinas's and the contemporary concept of 'cause'. (pp. 77-78.)
5.
STl q. 2, a. 1; in Phys lb. 1, le. 1; in De Hebd.le. 1.

The Evidential Argument from Evil, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996. Pp. 384. $45.00 (cloth),
$22.50 (paper).
KEVIN MEEKER, University of Notre Dame
This important anthology offers not only some significant new statements of and attacks on arguments that purport to provide strong, but
not conclusive, evidence for atheism based on evil but also a fairly comprehensive bibliography on the subject. In what follows I will summarize some main themes of each essay and briefly reflect on a few central
issues in the debate.
The first two chapters formulate the most potent versions of the evidential challenge to theism. Chapter One reprints William Rowe's "The
Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism". Assuming that God
would only allow evil that was (logically) necessary for a greater good,
Rowe argues roughly that atheism is reasonable because it is likely that
there are some instances of suffering that are not necessary for any
greater good. In other words, because it seems that God (if such a being
existed) could have thwarted the occurrence of certain instances of suffering without forfeiting any greater good (or at least we see no reason
why God could not have done so), atheism is rationally justified. The
second chapter reproduces Paul Draper's "Pain and Pleasure: An
Evidential Problem for Theists". Draper contends that theism fares

